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RECENT DECISIONS
The determination of these qualities for which no objective standard
or measure are available, rests in the discretion of the Municipal Civil
Service Commission, subject to review by the courts in case of abuse.26
The provisions of the Commission in this particular instance,
however, do not detract from the competitive examination form,
because the list is made up of those whose merit and fitness has been
duly ascertained, and only then are those who have the relative train-
ing in athletic or educational fields given the extra credit 27 (and this
credit, too, on a competitive basis).28 The test of fitness comes after
and not before all applicants have had a fair opportunity to compete
in an open competitive examination held pursuant to the rules of the
Civil Service.29
It is apparent that the court saw in the refusal of the applications
of the petitioners an opportunity to extend to the Police Department
a personnel as able as is possible to obtain for "a person who has had
such training, will for that reason, make a more useful policeman
* * * in order to maintain law, order, and adequate protection for
society against modem, organized criminals." 30
H.L.
NEGLIGENCE-FoRESEEABILITY OF RESULT-PROXIMATE CAUSE
-ATTRAcTIVE NUISANCE.-The infant plaintiff brought an action for
personal injuries sustained when he, while lawfully on a public street,
tripped and fell into a bonfire that had been built in the street by
several other boys with gasoline they had stolen from a drip can on
the unfenced premises of the defendant corporation. Plaintiff had
not trespassed on the premises of defendant and had not aided in the
26 Fink v. Finegan, 270 N. Y. 356, 363, 1 N. E. (2d) 462, 465 (1936).
Here the court held that the examiner's use of a non-competitive test to deter-
mine whether the applicant for medical examiner had force and executive ability
was an abuse of discretion on the part of the committee. Cxv SlavWC LAW§§ 9, 12.
27 I; re Keymer, 148 N. Y. 219, 42 N. E. 667 (1896).
28 Instant case at 243. It appears in the record that educational training
has always been used as a test of merit and fitness. In examinations for x-ray
technicians, education and experience receive a weight of 4; junior and civil
service examiner, a weight of 3 for education and experience; a credit of not
more than five per cent was given to successful candidates in the last examina-
tion for firemen F. D., who had relevant engineering degrees from an accredited
institution. Provisions for extra credit were incorporated into the HENDFL AcT,
N. Y. Laws 1931, c. 798, § 19, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 822,
UNCONsOrL LAWS § 2471, which provides in part that "in the grading of eligible
lists established as a result of civil service competitive examinations, a due
credit shall be given for experience. * * *."
29 Sheridan v. Kern, 255 App. Div. 57, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 336, 341 (1st Dept.
1938); People v. Lyman, 157 N. Y. 368, 52 N. E. 132 (1898).
30 Instant case at 241.
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theft of the gasoline. The defendant was engaged in the manufacture
of steel tanks and in the conduct of its business kept, without the
required permit from the city of New York for the storage of gaso-
line, a drum of gasoline having a spigot. A drip can was kept under
the spigot to prevent the ground from becoming saturated. From
this can trespassing boys had stolen the gasoline to replenish the bon-
fire into which the plaintiff fell. The theory of the action was two-
fold: first, negligence which the plaintiff apparently attempted to base
on the doctrine of attractive nuisance and, second, nuisance based on
the failure of the defendant to obtain the permit required by city
ordinance for the storage of gasoline. Upon appeal, judgment entered
upon a verdict found for plaintiff on both counts and affirmed by the
Appellate Division,' held, reversed, complaint dismissed. Plaintiff
failed to prove that defendant was guilty of negligence in the conduct
of its business. Morse et al. v. Buffalo Tank Corporation, 280 N. Y.
110, 19 N. E. (2d) 981 (1939).
It is fundamental in the law of torts that for liability to attach it
must be reasonably foreseeable that injury will result from the act or
omission. The injuries to the plaintiff did not arise out of any inher-
ently dangerous characteristic of gasoline, but merely out of its com-
bustibility. If one is expected to foresee that gasoline may be stolen
and so used to the injury of another, then by the same reasoning he
can be required to foresee that ordinary wood may be stolen from his
premises with the same result.2 A person does not have to anticipate
the mischievous or criminal acts of others which may inflict damage.
This is true even though the acts are those of children.3 "Passive
negligence may constitute proximate cause if it is the direct cause of
the injury, but where the negligence of one person is merely passive
and potential while the negligence of another is the moving and effec-
tive cause of the injury, the latter is the proximate cause and fixes the
liability." 4
One who stores explosives and inflammables without a permit
and in violation of an ordinance becomes a wrongdoer and is
answerable for the proximate consequences of the wrong, that is, the
consequences that ought to have been foreseen by a reasonably pru-
dent man.5  But in order for the violation of an ordinance to impose
1 255 App. Div. 712, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 645 (2d Dept. 1938). The Appellate
Division affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff on the authority of Parnell v.
Holland Furnace Co., 234 App. Div. 567, 256 N. Y. Supp. 323 (4th Dept.
1932), aff'd, 260 N. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112 (1932), but the court distinguishes
that case by the fact that the plaintiff was not a trespasser or a bare licensee,
but was rightfully upon the land at the invitation of one of the other tenants.
The land on which the automobile had been abandoned, the open tank of which
exploded when the plaintiff knocked two rocks together causing a spark, was
not only a private driveway, but was a portion of the yard used in common by
the defendants and other tenants of the common landlord.
2 Instant case.
3 Frashella v. Taylor, 157 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1916).
4 45 C. J. (1928) 910, §481.
5 Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 219 N. Y. 60, 113 N. E. 529 (1916).
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liability it must appear that the injury would have been prevented if
there had been compliance with the ordinance or statute.6 In the
instant case, the failure of the defendant to obtain the permit required
by the ordinance was not the proximate cause of the accident.
Although the court in the course of its opinion calls attention to
the Walsh case 7 holding the doctrine of attractive nuisance inappli-
cable in New York, the facts in this case would render that doctrine
inapplicable even in jurisdictions which embrace it inasmuch as the
plaintiff was not trespassing upon defendant's premises when injured.
If relief based on the doctrine of attractive nuisance were granted to
the plaintiff it would be an extension of the recognized limits of the
doctrine. As a general rule the owner or occupier of land owes no
further or greater duty to a trespasser than merely to refrain from
the infliction of wanton or wilful injuries upon him. Traps such as
spring guns may not be set for a trespasser without incurring liability
if the trespasser is thereby injured.8 And it is generally recognized
that no different or greater duty is owed to an infant trespasser than
to an adult trespasser.9 This, however, is subject to one well-known
exception, generally termed the doctrine of the attractive nuisance.
If the owner or occupier of land maintains on his premises a condi-
tion, instrumentality or device that is alluring or particularly attractive
to young children and they are thereby injured, the owner is liable
even though the child was trespassing when it was injured. How-
ever, everything that is attractive to children, and at the same time
dangerous, cannot be characterized as an attractive nuisance. Almost
anything may attract a child.10 The doctrine is based on the theory
that the condition or instrumentality, being particularly attractive to
children, is an implied invitation to them to trespass." But tempta-
tion is not always an invitation 12 and the theory of implied invitation
is considered fallacious by some.' 3 This doctrine of attractive nui-
sance originated in England.' 4  It is accepted by a number of Ameri-
6 Chrystal v. Troy and Boston R. R., 124 N. Y. 519, 26 N. E. 1103 (1891).
7 Walsh v. Fitchburg Ry., 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895).
8 Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828).
9 Helles v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R., 265 Fed. 192 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920);
McCarthy v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R., 240 Fed. 602 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
10 Hayko v. Colorado and Utah Coal Co., 77 Colo. 143, 235 Pac. 373
(1925).
11 Smalley v. Rio Grande Western R. R., 34 Utah 423, 98 Pac. 311 (1908).
12 Erie R. R. v. Hilt, 247 U. S. 97, 38 Sup. Ct. 435 (1918).
13 (1898) 11 HARv. L. REv. 349.
1445 C. J. (1928) 758, § 155; Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B: 29, 113 Eng. Rep.
1041 (1841). In this case the plaintiff, a child of seven, climbed upon a cart
that the defendant had left unattended on the street. Another child led the
horse and the plaintiff fell and was hurt. The court held the defendant liable
even though the infant was wrongfully on the cart and contributed to his
injuries by his own mischief.
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can jurisdictions, 15 by the United States Supreme Court,16 and with
modifications it is embraced by the Restatement. 1 7  But New York
15 The following jurisdictions follow the doctrine of attractive nuisance:
ALA.-Alabama G. S. R. R. v. Crocker, 131 Ala. 584, 31 So. 561 (1901);
AaIz.-Salladay v. Old Dominion Copper Mining Co., 12 Ariz. 124, 100 Pac. 441
(1909); ARK.-See Valley Planing Mill Co. v. McDaniel, 119 Ark. 139, 170
S. W. 994 (1914); CAL.-Faylor v. Great Eastern Quicksilver Mining Co., 45
Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101 (1919); CoLo.-Denver City Tramway Co. v.
Nicholas, 35 Colo. 462, 84 Pac. 813 (1906); WASH., D. C.-Best v. Dist. of
Col., 291 U. S. 411, 54 Sup. Ct. 487 (1934); DEL.-Hurd v. Phoenix Co., 30
Del. 332, 106 AtI. 286 (1918) ; FLA.-Stark v. Holtzclaw, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So.
330 (1925) ; IDAHo-York v. Pacific and I. N. R. R., 8 Idaho 574, 69 Pac. 1042
(1902) ; ILL.-City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484 (1895);
IND.-Chicago and E. R. R. v. Fox, 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. E. 81 (1904);
IowA-Edgington v. Burlington C. R. & N. Ry., 116 Iowa 410, 90 N. W. 95
(1902) ; KAN.-Osborn v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. R., 86 Kan. 440, 121 Pac.
364 (1912) ; KY.-Louisville Ry. v. Esselman, 29 Ky. 333, 93 S. W. 50 (1906) ;
LA.-Westerfield v. Levis, 43-a. Ann. 63, 9 So. 52 (1891); MiNN.-Berg. v.
B & B Fuel Co., 122 Minn. 323, 142 N. W. 321 (1913); Miss.-Temple v.
McComb City Elec. Light & Power Co., 89 Miss. 1, 42 So. 874 (1907); Mo.-
Berry v. St. Louis M. & S. E. R. R., 214 Mo. 593, 114 S. W. 27 (1908);
MoNT.-Fusselman v. Yellowstone Valley Land Co., 53 Mont. 254, 163 Pac. 473
(1917); NEB.-Tucker v. Draper, 62 Neb. 66, 86 N. W. 917 (1901); NEV.-
Perry v. Tonopah Mining Co. of Nevada, 13 F. (2d) 865 (1915); N. C.-
Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting & Power Co., 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600
1908); N. D.-O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N. D. 554, 75 N. W. 919
1898); OKLA.-Ramage Mining Co. v. Thomas, 172 Okla. 24, 44 P. (2d) 19
(1935); OaE.-See Slattery v. Drake, 130 Ore. 693, 281 Pac. 846 (1929);
S. C.-Renno v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 120 S. C. 7, 112 S. E. 439 (1922);
S. D.-Baxter v. Park, 44 S. D. 360, 184 N. W. 198 (1921); TENN.-East
Tennessee & W. N. C. R. R. v. Cargille, 105 Tenn. 628, 59 S. W. 141 (1900) ;
TExAs-Dennison & P. & S. Ry. v. Harlan, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 427, 87 S. W.
732 (1905) ; UTAH-Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570 (1908) ;
WAs H.-McAllister v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 44 Wash. 179, 87 Pac.
68 (1906); Wis.-Kelly v. Southern Wisconsin Ry., 152 Wis. 328, 140 N. W.
60 (1913).
The Doctrine is not followed in the following jurisdictions: CONN.-
Skaling v. Sheedy, 101 Conn. 545, 126 Atl. 721 (1924); GA-See Southern
Cotton Oil Co. v. Pierce, 145 Ga. 130, 88 S. E. 672 (1916) (has refused to
extend the doctrine beyond the case of a turntable) ; ME-Nelson v. Burnham
& Morrill Co., 114 Me. 213, 95 Atl. 1029 (1915) ; MD.-State, to Use of Lorenz
v. Machen, 164 Md. 579, 165 AtI. 695 (1933); MAss.-Daniels v. New York
& N. E. R. R., 154 Mass. 349, 28 N. E. 283 (1891) ; MIcH.-Ryan v. Towar,
128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 644 (1901); N. H.-Devost v. Twin State Gas & E.
Co., 79 N. H. 411, 109 At. 839 (1920); N. J.-Turess v. New York, S. & W.
R. R., 61 N. J. Law 314, 40 Atl. 614 (1898) ; N. Y.-Walsh v. Fitchburg Ry.,
145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895); OHio-Wheeling & L. E. R. R. v.
Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N. E. 66 (1907) ; PA.-Thompson v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. R., 218 Pa. 444, 67 Atl. 768 (1907); R. I.-Paolina v. McKendall, 24
R. I. 432, 53 Atl. 268 (1902) ; VT.-Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79
Atl. 858 (1911); VA.-Walker's Adm'r v. Potomac F. & P. R. R., 105 Va. 226,
53 S. E. 113 (1906); W. VA.-Martino v. Rotondi, 91 W. Va. 482, 113 S. E.
760 (1922).
In New Mexico and Wyoming the question apparently has not been adjudi-
cated.
16 Sioux City and Pacific R. R. v. Harry G. Stout, 17 Wall. 657 (U. S.
1874).
17 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 339. "A possessor of land is subject to
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has never accepted the doctrine' 8 although many concluded that it
had done so in the Parnell case 19 and its adoption was advocated in
the Flaherty case.20
The trend is toward limiting the application of the doctrine of
attractive nuisance and this extends to the United States Supreme
Court which has led the jurisdictions following the doctrine.21 It is
submitted that the doctrine should be limited since its unlimited appli-
cation would impose a crushing burden of care on property owners.
However, the law has always recognized the need to protect minors
against their lack of discretion and judgment, both in contracts and in
crimes committed against them and involving their consent. It would
seem equally logical to afford a modicum of protection to children
trespassers where the danger and attractiveness of the instrumentality
is obvious to adults and the instrument is easily accessible to children
who may reach it despite the care of reasonably watchful parents, and
when the danger could, without undue hardship or inconvenience, be
eliminated by the owner.
L. D. B.
SUCCESSION TAXES-SITUS OF INTANGIBLES-DOUBLE TAXA-
TION (Two CAsES).-(First Case) Decedent, while a resident of
Colorado, created a trust of securities which she delivered to a Colo-
rado trustee, the settlor of the trust retaining the power of revocation.
After becoming a resident of New York, she died without exercising
liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a
structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
"(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to tres-
pass, and
"(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know
and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unusual risk of
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
"(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the
area made dangerous by it, and
"(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
Paragraph (d) would appear to be a modification of the general rule of
the turntable cases. It would probably be difficult to say that a turntable, for
example, is of slight utility to a railroad company as compared with the risk it
creates to young children.
18 Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N. Y. 110, 19 N. E. (2d) 981 (1939);
Walsh v. Fitchburg Ry., 1"45 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895).
19 Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co., 260 N. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112 (1932).2 0 Flaherty v. Metro Stations, Inc., 202 App. Div. 583, 196 N. Y. Supp. 2
(4th Dept. 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 605, 139 N. E. 753 (1923).
21 Compare Sioux City and Pacific R. R. v. Harry G. Stout, 17 Wall. 657
(U. S. 1874), with United Zinc and Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup.
Ct. 299 (1921).
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